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JOB POLARIZATION AND JOBLESS RECOVERIES
Nir Jaimovich and Henry E. Siu*
Abstract—Job polarization refers to the shrinking share of employment in
middle-skill, routine occupations experienced over the past 35 years. Jobless
recoveries refers to the slow rebound in aggregate employment following
recent recessions despite recoveries in aggregate output. We show how these
two phenomena are related. First, essentially all employment loss in routine
occupations occurs in economic downturns. Second, jobless recoveries in
the aggregate can be accounted for by jobless recoveries in the routine
occupations that are disappearing.
I. Introduction
IN the past 35 years, the U.S. labor market has seen the emer-gence of two new phenomena: job polarization and jobless
recoveries. Job polarization refers to the increasing concen-
tration of employment in the highest- and lowest-wage occu-
pations as jobs in middle-skill occupations disappear. Jobless
recoveries refer to periods following recessions in which re-
bounds in aggregate output are accompanied by much slower
recoveries in aggregate employment. We argue that the emer-
gence of jobless recoveries is linked to the job polarization
process.
Consider first the phenomenon of job polarization. Ace-
moglu (1999), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006), Goos and
Manning (2007), and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2009),
among others, document that employment is becoming con-
centrated at the tails of the occupational skill distribution.
This process has accelerated since the 1980s, as per capita
employment in middle-skill jobs disappears. This hollowing
out of the middle is linked to the disappearance of occupations
focused on routine tasks—activities that can be performed by
following a well-defined set of procedures. Autor, Levy, and
Murnane (2003) and the subsequent literature demonstrate
that job polarization is primarily due to progress in technolo-
gies that substitute for labor in performing routine tasks.1
In this same time period, Gordon and Baily (1993),
Groshen and Potter (2003), and Bernanke (2003, 2009),
among others, discuss the emergence of jobless recoveries.
In the past three recessions of 1991, 2001, and 2009, aggre-
gate employment continues to decline for years following
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the turning point in aggregate income and output. No con-
sensus has yet emerged regarding the source of these jobless
recoveries.2
In this paper, we report two related findings. First, the dis-
appearance of per capita employment in routine occupations
associated with job polarization is not simply a gradual phe-
nomenon; the loss is concentrated in economic downturns.
Specifically, 88% of the job loss in these occupations since
the mid-1980s occurs within a 12-month window of NBER-
dated recessions. A number of researchers have noted that
the polarization process was accelerated by the Great Reces-
sion (see Autor, 2010, and Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011).
Our first point is that routine employment loss has happened
almost entirely in the previous three recessions.
Our second, and main, point is that jobless recoveries in
the aggregate can be accounted for by jobless recoveries in
the routine occupations that are disappearing. This is based
on three facts. First, employment in the routine occupations
identified by Autor et al. (2003), Autor and Dorn (2013), and
others accounts for a significant fraction of aggregate employ-
ment; averaged over the jobless recovery era, these jobs ac-
count for about 50% of total employment. Second, essentially
all of the contraction in per capita aggregate employment dur-
ing NBER-dated recessions can be attributed to recessions in
these middle-skill, routine occupations. Third, jobless recov-
eries are observed only in these disappearing, middle-skill
jobs. The high- and low-skill occupations to which employ-
ment is polarizing either do not experience contractions or,
if they do, rebound soon after the turning point in aggregate
output. Hence, jobless recoveries can be traced to the disap-
pearance of routine occupations in recessions. Finally, it is
important to note that jobless recoveries were not observed
in routine occupations—or in aggregate employment—prior
to the era of job polarization.
In section II, we present data on jobless recoveries and job
polarization. In section III, we present data documenting that
these two phenomena are related. In section IV, we discuss
additional evidence regarding the link between the decline of
employment in routine occupations and jobless recoveries.
Section V concludes.
II. Two Labor Market Phenomena
A. Jobless Recoveries
Figures 1 and 2 plot the cyclical behavior of aggregate per
capita employment in the United States during the past six
recessions and subsequent recoveries.3 Aggregate per capita
2See, for instance, Koenders and Rogerson (2005), Bachmann (2012), and
Berger (2012) for recent theoretical work.
3The 1980 recession is omitted since it is followed closely by a recession
beginning in 1981, limiting our ability to study its recovery.
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FIGURE 1.—AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT AROUND EARLY NBER RECESSIONS
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FIGURE 2.—AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT AROUND RECENT NBER RECESSIONS










4 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
employment is that of all civilian noninstitutionalized indi-
viduals aged 16 years and over (seasonally adjusted), nor-
malized by the population.4 Throughout the paper, recessions
are referred to by their trough year; for example, the reces-
sion that began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 is
referred to as the 2009 recession. Because the monthly em-
ployment data are noisy, the data are logged and bandpass-
filtered to remove only fluctuations at frequencies higher than
18 months (business cycle fluctuations are traditionally de-
fined as those between frequencies of 18 and 96 months).5
On the x-axis of each figure, the trough of the recession, as
identified by the NBER, is indicated as date 0; we plot data
for two years around the trough date. The shaded regions
indicate the NBER peak-to-trough periods. Employment is
normalized to 0 at the trough of each recession. Hence, the
y-axis measures the percent change in employment relative
to its value in the NBER trough.
Figure 1 displays the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions. In
each case, aggregate employment begins to expand within
six months of the trough. The fact that employment recovers
within two quarters of the turning point in aggregate out-
put and income is typical of the business cycle prior to the
mid-1980s (see, e.g., Schreft & Singh, 2003, and Groshen &
Potter, 2003).
This contrasts sharply from the 1991, 2001, and 2009 re-
cessions. As displayed in figure 2, these recoveries were job-
less: despite expansions in other measures of economic activ-
ity, such as real GDP (RGDP) and real gross domestic income,
following the trough, aggregate per capita employment con-
tinued to contract for many months. In 1991, employment
continues to fall for 17 months past the trough before turn-
ing around; employment does not reach its pre ecession level
until five years later, in 1996. In 2001, employment falls for
23 months past the trough before turning around; it does not
return to its prerecession level before the subsequent reces-
sion. Following the Great Recession of 2009, employment
takes 23 months to begin recovery. Hence, the jobless recov-
ery is a phenomenon characterizing recent recessions (see
also Groshen & Potter, 2003, and Bernanke, 2003).
Table 1 summarizes these differences, presenting several
measures of the speed of recovery following early and recent
recessions. Panel A concerns the recoveries in aggregate per
capita employment. The first row lists the number of months
it takes for employment to turn around (stop contracting), rel-
4Data are taken from the Labor Force Statistics of the CPS, downloaded
from the BLS website (bls.gov/data/). See appendix A for a detailed de-
scription of all data sources. Employment data at the aggregate and occu-
pational level are available dating back to 1959. Issues with the early CPS
data, especially during the 1961 recession, are well documented; see, for
instance, the President’s Committee to Appraise Employment and Unem-
ployment Statistics report, “Measuring Employment and Unemployment,”
commonly referred to as the Gordon report. The report’s recommendations
led to methodological changes adopted by the BLS in 1967 (see Stein,
1967). As such, our analysis uses data beginning in July 1967.
5We implement this using the bandpass filter proposed by Christiano and
Fitzgerald (2003), who discuss the merits of their method for isolating
fluctuations outside the traditional business cycle frequencies and near the
end points of data sets.
TABLE 1.—MEASURES OF RECOVERY FOLLOWING EARLY AND RECENT
RECESSIONS
Early Recent
1970 1975 1982 1991 2001 2009
A. Employment
Months to turn around 6 4 2 17 23 23
Months to trough level 16 10 4 31 55 76
Half-life (in months) 27 23 10 38 NA NA
B. Output
Months to turn around 0 0 0 0 0 0
Months to trough level 0 0 0 0 0 0
Half-life (in months) 7 10 5 9 3 15
Data from the CPS; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, and James
Stock and Mark Watson. See appendix A for details.
ative to the NBER trough date. The second row indicates the
number of months it takes fr m the trough date for employ-
ment to return to its level at the trough. The third row lists a
“half-life” measure: the number of months it takes from the
trough date to regain half of the employment lost during the
NBER-defined recession.
That there has been a marked change in the speed of
employment recoveries is obvious. Averaged over the three
early recessions, employment turns around approximately 4
months after the NBER trough date; in the recent recessions,
the average turnaround time is 21 months. Averaged over
the early recessions, employment returns to its trough level
within approximately 10 months. Over the three recent re-
cessions, this value is 54 months, taking almost 6.5 years to
return to its trough following the Great Recession. Finally,
while it takes at most 27 months from the trough date to re-
gain half of the employment lost in the three early recessions,
it takes at least 38 months in the recent recessions. Indeed,
employment never regained half of its loss following the 2001
recession and has yet to do so after the Great Recession.
This contrasts with the nature of recoveries in aggregate
output. Panel B in table 1 presents the same recovery mea-
sures for per capita RGDP. To obtain monthly measures, we
use the monthly data of Stock and Watson (see appendix A
for details). Given the NBER Dating Committee’s empha-
sis on RGDP and real gross domestic income in determining
cyclical turning points, it is perhaps not surprising that aggre-
gate output begins recovery on the NBER trough dates (see
nber.org/cycles/recessions_faq.html). This is true for both the
early and recent recessions, as indicated by the first two rows
of panel B. In the early recessions, it takes on average seven
months from the trough date for output to regain half of its
recessionary loss; in recent recessions, the average time taken
is nine months, only slightly greater.6 Hence, there has been
no marked change in the speed of recovery for aggregate out-
put across early and recent recessions. The differences in the
speed of recovery in employment following recent recessions,
6Because the monthly RGDP estimates of Stock and Watson are “noisy,”
the data are bandpass-filtered to remove fluctuations at frequencies higher
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without corresponding differences in the recovery speed of
output, characterize the jobless recovery phenomenon.
B. Job Polarization
The structure of employment has changed dramatically in
the past 35 years. One of the most pervasive aspects of change
has been within the occupational wage distribution: employ-
ment has become polarized, with employment share shifting
away from middle-skill occupations toward both the high-
and low-skill tails of the distribution (see, e.g., Acemoglu &
Autor, 2011).
To see this, we disaggregate total employment by occupa-
tional groups. Appendix A discusses the occupational classi-
fication in detail; online appendix A discusses the robustness
of our results to alternative classifications used in the liter-
ature. For brevity, we include a summary here. Following
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we delineate occupations along
two dimensions: “cognitive” versus “manual” and “routine”
versus “nonroutine.” These delineations are based on the skill
content of the tasks performed in the occupation. The distinc-
tion between cognitive and manual jobs is straightforward,
characterized by differences in the extent of mental versus
physical activity. The distinction between routine and non-
routine jobs is based on the work of Autor et al. (2003). If the
tasks involved can be summarized as a relatively small set of
specific activities accomplished by following well-defined
instructions and procedures, the occupation is considered
routine. If instead the job entails a larger number of tasks
requiring flexibility, creativity, problem solving, or human
interaction skills, the occupation is nonroutine.
In this delineation, nonroutine cognitive occupations in-
clude managerial, professional, and technical workers, such
as physicians, public relations managers, financial analysts,
computer programmers, and economists. Routine cognitive
occupations are those in sales and in office and administrative
support—for example, secretaries, bank tellers, retail sales-
people, travel agents, mail clerks, and data entry keyers. Rou-
tine manual occupations are blue-collar jobs, such as machine
operators and tenders, mechanics, dressmakers, fabricators
and assemblers, and meat processing workers. Nonroutine
manual occupations are service jobs, including janitors, gar-
deners, manicurists, bartenders, home care aides, and per-
sonal care workers.
These classifications correspond to rankings in the occu-
pational wage distribution. Nonroutine cognitive occupations
tend to be high-skill occupations and nonroutine manual oc-
cupations low skilled. Routine jobs, both cognitive and man-
ual, tend to occupy the middle of the occupational wage dis-
tribution (see, e.g., Autor, 2010; Firpo et al., 2014; and Goos
et al., 2014). Given this, we combine the routine cognitive
and routine manual occupations into one group.7
7For brevity, the analogs of all of our figures with the routine occupations
split into two groups can be found in an earlier version of this paper, available
at http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/hsiu/research/polar20120331.pdf. None of our
Figure 3 displays data relating to job polarization. We
present data by decade, as is common in the literature (Au-
tor, 2010), except the final bar covering the fifteen-year pe-
riod 2002 to 2017. Each bar represents the percent change
in an occupation group’s share of total employment, from
the starting year to the terminal year, using annual averages.
Over time, the share of employment in high-skill (nonroutine
cognitive) and low-skill (nonroutine manual) jobs has been
growing. This has been accompanied by a hollowing out of
the middle-skill, routine occupations. Hence, there has been a
polarization in employment away from routine, middle-skill
jobs toward nonroutine cognitive and manual jobs. In 1982,
routine occupations accounted for approximately 56% of to-
tal employment; in 2017, this share had fallen to 42%.
III. Linking the Two Phenomena
A. Occupational Employment: Long-Run Dynamics
As noted, job polarization involves the long-term decline
in employment in routine occupations as a share of total em-
ployment. This declining share can be due to decreases in
routine employment (in the numerator), increases in nonrou-
tine employment (denominator), or both. We find an impor-
tant change in the dynamics of routine employment during the
job polarization era. Given our interest in jobless recoveries in
per capita aggregate employment, documented in section IIA,
the decline of per capita employment in routine occupations
is the primary object of interest throughout our analysis. We
ask how this process has unfolded over time: whether the
losses have occurred gradually, or whether they are bunched
up within certain time intervals. Figure 4 displays time series
for per capita employment in the three occupational groups of
figure 3 at a monthly frequency from July 1967 to December
2017.
As is evident from the figure, both of the nonroutine oc-
cupational groups are growing over time. Per capita employ-
ment in nonroutine cognitive occupations displays a 59 log
point increase during this period. After declining from 1967
to 1973, nonroutine manual employment displays a 17 log
point increase. Recessions have temporarily halted these oc-
cupations’ growth to varying extents but have not abated the
upward trends.
This stands in stark contrast to the routine occupational
group. In per capita terms, routine employment was relatively
constant until the late 1980s and fell 29 log points from the
local peak in 1990 to 2017.
The growth of per capita employment in nonroutine jobs
(coupled with the lack of growth in routine jobs) makes it
clear that the share of employment in routine occupations has
been in decline since at least 1967. Hence, what differentiates
the job polarization era that began in the 1980s is the obvious
acceleration in the relative decline of routine employment.











6 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
FIGURE 3.—PERCENT CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT SHARES BY OCCUPATION GROUP
Data from the CPS. See appendix A for details.
This acceleration is due to the fact that per capita routine
employment is disappearing in level terms.
What is equally clear in figure 4 is that routine job loss has
not occurred steadily during the past 35 years. The decline
is concentrated in economic downturns, which occurred in
essentially three steps. Following its peak in 1990, per capita
employment in these occupations fell 3.5% to the trough of
the 1991 recession and a further 1.8% during the subsequent
jobless recovery. After a minor rebound, employment was es-
sentially flat until the 2001 recession. In the two-year window
around the 2001 trough, this group shed 6.2% of its employ-
ment before leveling off again. Routine employment plum-
meted again in the Great Recession—11.3% in the two-year
window around the trough—with no subsequent recovery,
quite obviously.
To state this slightly differently, 88% of the 29 log point
fall in per capita routine employment that occurred from 1990
to 2017 occurred within a twelve-month window of NBER
recessions (six months prior to the peak and six months after
the trough). Hence, this stark aspect of job polarization is
observed during recessions.
B. Occupational Employment: Business Cycle Snapshots
In the job polarization era, per capita employment in rou-
tine occupations disappeared during recessions. Moreover, as
figure 4 makes clear, prior to the disappearance of routine oc-
cupations, routine employment always recovered following
recessions. In this section, we investigate whether this change
in the dynamics of routine employment has contributed to the
jobless recoveries following the three recent recessions. This
is quantitatively plausible since routine occupations account
for a substantial fraction of aggregate employment.
To do this, we zoom in on recessionary episodes. Fig-
ures 5 and 6 plot per capita employment for the routine and
nonroutine occupational groups around NBER recessions.
These figures are constructed in the same manner as figures
1 and 2.8
Figure 5 displays the early recessions of 1970, 1975, and
1982 and their subsequent recoveries. Contractions in em-
ployment are clearly observed in the routine occupations.
In the nonroutine occupational group, employment was ei-
ther flat or growing during these recessions and recoveries.
Hence, the contractions in per capita aggregate employment
displayed in figure 1 are due almost exclusively to the routine
occupations; this is true despite the fact that routine occupa-
tions account for only 58% of total employment, averaged
over the 1967–1982 period. Measuring from NBER peak to
trough, 97% of all per capita job loss in both the 1970 and
1975 recessions was accounted for by job loss in routine occu-
pations. In the 1982 recession, job loss in routine occupations
accounted for 145% of the aggregate as employment actually
grew in the nonroutine group.
Moreover, no jobless recoveries were observed in the rou-
tine occupational group in these early episodes. Follow-
ing these recessions, routine employment begins recovering
8For the analogous figures with the nonroutine cognitive and nonroutine
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FIGURE 4.—EMPLOYMENT IN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, 1967–2017
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FIGURE 5.—OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AROUND EARLY NBER RECESSIONS
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FIGURE 6.—OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AROUND RECENT NBER RECESSIONS
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within seven months of the trough. This mirrors the lack of
jobless recoveries at the aggregate level displayed in figure
1. Comparing figures 1 and 5, it is clear that the cyclical dy-
namics of aggregate employment in the 1970, 1975, and 1982
episodes are driven by the dynamics of routine employment.
Comparing figures 2 and 6, it is again clear that the re-
cession and recovery dynamics of aggregate employment in
1991, 2001, and 2009 mirror the dynamics of routine employ-
ment. Consider, for instance, the 1991 recession displayed in
the uppermost panels. In the 15 months prior to the trough,
per capita aggregate employment falls by 2.0% and falls a
further 0.5% during the 24-month window after the reces-
sion displayed in figure 2. Figure 6 indicates that this pattern
is not exhibited in nonroutine occupations. During this time
window, per capita nonroutine employment rises, with only
a mild (0.4%) contraction and clear recovery beginning on
the NBER trough date.9 Only routine employment exhibits
the same pattern as in the aggregate, with a 3.5% fall in the
15 months prior to the trough, and a further 1.8% decline in
the 24-month recovery period.
Indeed, figure 6 indicates that routine occupations expe-
rience jobless recoveries in all three of the recent episodes.
Per capita routine employment experiences clear contractions
during each recession. As with the early episodes, these occu-
pations account for the bulk of the contraction in aggregate
employment. In the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, rou-
tine jobs account for 89%, 91%, and 94% of all job loss,
respectively. This is despite the fact that routine occupations
account for approximately 51% of total employment, aver-
aged between 1983 and 2011 (two years following the 2009
recession).
More important, routine occupations show no recoveries in
figure 6. As discussed above, per capita employment in rou-
tine occupations falls a further 1.8% in the 24 months follow-
ing the end of the 1991 recession. A similar picture emerges
for the 2001 recession: large employment losses leading up
to the trough are followed by a further 2.8% loss afterward. In
2009, these occupations are hit especially hard, falling 11.8%
from the NBER peak to trough and a further 2.3% in the two
years after. Indeed, per capita routine employment shows no
recovery to date, down 3.9% from the recession’s trough to
December 2017.
To summarize, jobless recoveries are evident in only the
three most recent recessions and are clearly evident only in
routine occupations. In this occupational group, employment
never recovers—in the short, medium, or long term. These
occupations are disappearing.10 By contrast, nonroutine oc-
cupations either experience no contractions or only mild
9We note, however, that the average recovery of nonroutine employment
following the three recent recessions is slower than that of the early reces-
sions. This is due in part to the fact that nonroutine employment actually
grew during the 1982 recession, and to the slow recovery following the
Great Recession. We return to this latter point below.
10For further analysis of this process in terms of worker gross flows (job
creation/separation, occupational switching), see Cortes (2016) and Cortes
et al. (2016).
contractions during recessions, and no jobless recoveries af-
terward. In this sense, the jobless recovery phenomenon is
accounted for by the disappearance of routine jobs.
C. A Counterfactual Exercise
To make this final point clear, we perform a simple ac-
counting exercise to investigate the role of the disappearance
of routine employment in accounting for jobless recoveries.
This is informative since recessions in aggregate employment
are due almost entirely to recessions in routine occupations.
We ask what would have happened in recent recessions if
the postrecession behavior of employment in routine occupa-
tions had looked more similar to the early recessions. Would
the economy still have experienced jobless recoveries in the
aggregate?11
For the 1991, 2001, and 2009 recessions, we replace the
per capita employment in routine occupations following the
trough with their average response following the troughs of
the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions. We do this in a way
that matches the magnitude of the fall in employment after
each recent recession but follows the time pattern of the early
recessions. In particular, we ensure that the turning point in
routine employment comes five months after the trough, as
in the average of those recoveries. We then sum up the actual
employment in nonroutine occupations with the counterfac-
tual employment in routine occupations to obtain a counter-
factual aggregate employment series. The behavior of these
counterfactual series around the recent NBER trough dates is
displayed in figure 7. Further details regarding the construc-
tion of the counterfactuals are discussed in appendix B.
Figure 7 makes clear that had it not been for the disap-
pearance of routine jobs that occurs during recessions, we
would not have observed jobless recoveries. Aggregate em-
ployment would have experienced clear turning points five,
five, and seven months after the troughs of the 1991, 2001,
and 2009 recessions, respectively. In the 1991 and 2001 re-
cessions, employment would have exceeded its value at the
NBER-dated trough within ten months. In the case of the
2009 recession, recovery back to the trough level would have
taken eighteen months. This is due to the fact that the most
recent, and far more severe, recession was experienced more
broadly across occupations and because routine employment
represents a shrinking share of total employment over time.
Interestingly, while employment in nonroutine occupations
suffered only mild contraction during the recession (falling
1.1% in the ten months prior to the trough), it continued to
contract by 1.8% in the sixteen months following the NBER
trough date. Hence, the malaise in the labor market following
the 2009 recession is, unsurprisingly, not solely accounted
for by routine occupations given the nature of the Great
11In spite of the results presented in section IIIB, the answer to this is
not immediate since in the jobless recovery era, routine jobs account for
only 50% of aggregate employment. Reversing jobless recoveries in rou-
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FIGURE 7.—ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL EMPLOYMENT AROUND RECENT NBER RECESSIONS
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Recession. Nonetheless, the counterfactual exercise indicates
that employment would have recovered, as opposed to declin-
ing in the 24 months following the end of the recession.
We note again that jobless recoveries cannot be accounted
for by a change in the postrecession behavior of employ-
ment in nonroutine occupations. This is perhaps not surpris-
ing given that the dynamics of nonroutine employment play
little role in that of aggregate employment during recessions.
Nonetheless, we have performed the same counterfactual as
above, but replacing the employment response in nonroutine
occupations following the recent recessions with their aver-
age response following the early ones. Though not displayed
for brevity, we find that this generates no clear recovery in
aggregate employment beyond its trough value in any of the
recent episodes. By contrast, aggregate employment recovers
beyond its trough value within ten, ten, and eighteen months
in the 1991, 2001, and 2009 episodes, respectively, in the
counterfactual with routine employment.
D. Further Discussion
Here we offer a few points of clarification regarding job
polarization and jobless recoveries by discussing the role of
the goods-producing industries and educational composition
in accounting for these two phenomena. Online appendix A
contains additional discussion on the robustness of our key
results to further disaggregation of routine occupations into
cognitive and manual components and alternative categoriza-
tions of routine occupations.
Manufacturing and construction. This paper emphasizes
the recession and recovery dynamics of routine employment.
Given this, it is possible that our emphasis on routine occupa-
tions is simply a relabeling of dynamics in the cyclically sen-
sitive goods-producing industries, manufacturing and con-
struction. This, however, is not the case.
Consider the three early recessions of 1970, 1975, and
1982. Taking a simple average across these recessions, man-
ufacturing and construction accounted for 82% of the ag-
gregate per capita employment lost from NBER peak to
trough. Averaging across the three recent recessions of 1991,
2001, and 2009, only 50% of total job loss was accounted
for by these industries. So while the goods-producing in-
dustries account for a disproportionate fraction of reces-
sionary job losses, it is clear that a significant fraction oc-
curs in service production as well, and especially recently.
But as discussed in section IIIB, routine occupations ac-
counted for 113% and 91% of aggregate job loss when av-
eraged across the three early and three recent recessions, re-
spectively. Hence, categorizing across goods- and service-
producing industries provides a somewhat useful distinction
in studying cyclical fluctuations in employment. But a more
valuable categorization—one that perhaps has not been suffi-
ciently appreciated within macroeconomics—exists in distin-
guishing between routine and nonroutine occupations: reces-
sionary job loss is experienced across all industries, namely
in routine occupations across industries.
More specifically, it is possible that the phenomena of job
polarization and jobless recoveries simply reflect the employ-
ment dynamics of manufacturing and construction. It is well
known that manufacturing employment is more “routine in-
tensive” compared to the economy as a whole. Following the
Great Recession, for instance, the routine occupation share
of manufacturing employment is 68%, as compared to 44%
economy-wide. And employment in manufacturing, during
both the early and recent recessions, follows a similar pattern
to that of routine occupations (across all industries). Man-
ufacturing employment displayed strong cyclical rebounds
prior to the mid-1980s; in the three recent recessions, em-
ployment has failed to recover following rebounds in manu-
facturing (and aggregate) output.
We first note that job loss in manufacturing accounts for
only a fraction of the job loss in routine occupations. Across
all industries, routine employment has fallen 29 log points
from 1990 to 2017, as displayed in figure 4. In levels, this
reflects a per capita employment loss of 0.081. But manu-
facturing aside, all other sectors of the economy have also
experienced a pronounced loss of routine jobs. Routine em-
ployment in sectors outside manufacturing has fallen 22 log
points during the same period. This represents a per capita
employment loss of 0.051. Hence, manufacturing accounts
for only 0.03/0.081 = 37% of the observed routine job loss.
This point has also been made by Autor et al. (2003) and
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who demonstrate that job po-
larization is due largely to shifts in occupational compo-
sition (away from routine toward nonroutine jobs) within
industries, as opposed to shifts in industrial composition
(away from routine-intensive towards nonroutine-intensive
industries).
Second, jobless recoveries experienced in the past 35 years
cannot be explained simply by jobless recoveries in the
manufacturing sector. While the postrecession behavior of
employment in manufacturing mimics that of routine oc-
cupations, it plays only a small part in generating jobless
recoveries. This is because manufacturing accounts for a
quantitatively small share of total employment (approxi-
mately 18% in the mid-1980s and less than 10% at present).
To demonstrate this, figure 8 performs the same counterfac-
tual exercise for the manufacturing industry as figure 7 does
for routine occupations. In each of the three jobless recover-
ies, we replace the employment response in manufacturing
following the trough with their average response following
the troughs of the early recessions. We then sum up the actual
employment in nonmanufacturing industries with the coun-
terfactual employment in manufacturing to obtain a counter-
factual per capita aggregate employment series.
Figure 8 displays the behavior of these counterfactual se-
ries around the 1991, 2001, and 2009 NBER trough dates.
Eliminating the jobless recovery in manufacturing implies
that following the 1991 recession, aggregate employment re-
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FIGURE 8.—ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL EMPLOYMENT AROUND RECENT NBER RECESSIONS: THE MANUFACTURING CASE
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the 31 months observed in the data. This is still appreciably
longer than the average of 10 months required in the early
recoveries. Following the 2001 and 2009 recessions, alter-
ing the recovery in manufacturing has even less impact. Ag-
gregate employment would still have been below the value
at the trough, a full 24 months after the recession ended.
Jobless recoveries would still have been observed following
each recessionary episode. This evidence is consistent with
the findings of Aaronson et al. (2004), who find that jobless
recoveries cannot be explained by structural change at the
industry level.
Finally, we note that neither phenomena are due to employ-
ment dynamics in construction. Of the total job losses in rou-
tine occupations from 1990 to 2017, only 6% are accounted
for by construction. And while not displayed here for brevity,
we have performed the same counterfactual experiment for
the construction industry that figure 8 does for manufactur-
ing. Following each of the recent recessions, replacing the
employment response in construction with their average re-
sponse following the early recessions has almost no effect
on per capita aggregate employment. Construction plays es-
sentially no role in accounting jobless recoveries since the
industry accounts for a very small share (approximately 5%)
of total employment.12
Education. Here, we clarify the role of education in ac-
counting for the decline of routine employment and jobless
recoveries. The share of low-educated workers in the labor
force (those with high school diplomas or less) has declined
in the past 35 years, and these workers exhibit greater busi-
ness cycle sensitivity than those with higher education. It is
thus possible to conjecture that the terms routine and low ed-
ucation are interchangeable. In what follows, we show that
this is not the case.
In particular, it is true that education is correlated with
occupation. However, as Acemoglu and Autor (2011) dis-
cussed, educational attainment is more closely aligned with
the distinction between cognitive versus manual occupations,
with high- (low-) educated workers tending to work in cog-
nitive (manual) jobs. As such, job polarization—the disap-
pearance of employment in routine occupations relative to
nonroutine occupations—cannot be explained simply by the
change in educational composition. Consider the case of high
school graduates, who make up the majority of low-educated
workers. In levels, their per capita employment has fallen
0.059 from 1990 to present. However, this fall is highly con-
centrated, with 91% of the loss occurring in routine occupa-
tions. In contrast, employment among high school graduates
in nonroutine jobs has remained essentially constant, falling
by only 0.008 during the polarization period.13
12See also Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2019) for a discussion of
housing and manufacturing employment during the most recent business
cycle boom and bust.
13The importance of the routine/nonroutine distinction is further illus-
trated by the “some college” group—those with more than high school
attainment but less than a college degree. Per capita employment in
Similarly, jobless recoveries are not simply a phenomenon
reflecting the postrecession dynamics of low education em-
ployment. In particular, business cycle fluctuations for high
school educated workers differ greatly across occupational
groups. For these workers, per capita employment in rou-
tine occupations fell 3.6%, 4.0%, and 13.2% in the 1991,
2001, and 2009 recessions, respectively. And indeed, it is
this group that is disappearing and not recovering. Averaged
across the three recessions, employment is down a further
1.5% from the level at the NBER trough, a full 24 months
into the economic recovery. By contrast, employment of high
school graduates in nonroutine occupations experienced ex-
tremely mild contractions—of 0.9%, 0.2%, and 0.5% in the
three recent recessions—and no long-term disappearance.
Thus, among these low-educated workers, jobless recover-
ies are to be found only in routine occupations.
IV. Further Evidence
In section III, we exploit time series variation across the
pre- and postjob polarization eras to demonstrate the role of
the decline in routine occupations in jobless recoveries: prior
to the long-run decline in per capita routine employment, job-
less recoveries did not occur; jobless recoveries have emerged
since the decline in employment in these occupations. In ad-
dition, the role attributed to routine employment dynamics
is not simply a proxy for industrial shifts or the changing
educational composition of the economy.
Here we provide additional evidence and discuss related
literature regarding the role of routine job loss in jobless re-
coveries. We begin with state-level evidence for the United
States, and conclude with evidence from an international
sample of industrialized economies that have undergone job
polarization in the past thirty years.
A. State-Level Evidence
We ask whether the pre- and postpolarization differences
of section III, observed in the aggregate, are evident at the
finer U.S. state level of aggregation. Unsurprisingly, there
is a great deal of heterogeneity in economic performance
across the fifty U.S. states. As a result, the national reces-
sions considered so far are not necessarily reflected in output
and employment statistics for all states.14 We therefore focus
on the two largest recessions, the 1982 and 2009 “episodes,”
to maximize the power of the pre- and postpolarization
comparison.
We use state-level data on RGDP and per capita employ-
ment. In a manner analogous to the NBER Dating Committee,
this group has risen 7% since 1990. However, it has risen only in non-
routine occupations (by 24%); routine employment has actually fallen
7% for the same college group, reflecting polarization among these rel-
atively high-educated workers. See also the discussion in Autor et al.
(2003).
14For instance, the oil and gas boom meant North Dakota avoided reces-
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Routine share of total loss 0.51 1.10 1.39
Total recovery versus loss 0.83 1.56 2.42
Routine recovery versus loss 0.93 1.41 2.18
B. 2009
Routine share of total loss 0.83 0.93 1.10
Total recovery versus loss −0.38 −0.25 −0.01
Routine recovery versus loss −0.53 −0.18 0.02
Counterfactual recovery versus loss 0.95 1.28 1.44
Actual data from the CPS. Counterfactual described in online appendix B.
we determine whether a state experienced a recession coin-
cident with the macrolevel episode and, if so, assign state-
specific peak and trough dates. Overall, we identify 34 states
as experiencing recession during the 1982 episode and 35
states during the 2009 episode (the specific states and details
of approach are discussed in online appendix B).
Section IIIB demonstrates that recessions in per capita em-
ployment in the aggregate are due almost exclusively to rou-
tine occupations. This is true at the state level as well. The first
row of table 2, panel A, considers this for the 1982 recession,
using the fraction of total job loss that is accounted for by
job loss in routine occupations. Given the distribution of out-
comes across states, we report the median fraction along with
the interquartile range. For the median state that experienced
recession during the 1982 episode, 110% of the state’s per
capita employment contraction was due to routine job loss.
This fraction ranges from 51% at the 25th percentile to 139%
at the 75th percentile. Moreover, state-level employment re-
covered following the cyclical trough in the 1982 episode.
Row 2 reports the ratio of per capita employment gain in the
two years following the trough, relative to the state’s peak-
to-trough employment loss. For the median state, per capita
employment gains were 156% of its losses during the reces-
sion, with interquartile range of 83% to 242%. Prior to the job
polarization era, employment recovered following recessions
in the aggregate and at the state level.
Importantly, this recovery was accompanied by recovery
of employment in routine occupations. Row 3 of table 2 re-
ports the same ratio as in the second row, but only for routine
employment. At the median, (two-year) per capita routine
employment gains were 141% of losses incurred during re-
cession. Indeed, out of the total employment gained in the
two years following the median state’s trough, 134% of it
was accounted for by gains in routine occupations. This last
result is not reported in the table since the analogous statistic
cannot be reported for the postpolarization episode, as will
become clear.
In the 2009 episode, again, the bulk of total employment
lost at the state level is accounted for by routine employment.
The first row of panel B indicates that for the median state,
93% of its per capita employment contraction was due to
routine job loss. This corresponds closely to the value of 94%
observed at the national level.
Nationally, the recovery was jobless, and this is true at the
state level as well. The second row of panel B considers the
ratio of a state’s employment gain in the two years following
recession, relative to its recessionary loss. The interquartile
range is negative: for most states, total per capita employ-
ment continued to decline after the recession ended. Gains
were experienced in only eight states in the two years fol-
lowing their cyclical trough, and in no state did per capita
employment return to its prerecession peak.
Moreover, this lack of recovery in total employment is mir-
rored by a lack of recovery in routine employment. Row 3
of table 2, panel B, reports the ratio of per capita employ-
ment gain in routine occupations during the two years after
the trough relative to routine employment loss in the reces-
sion. Again, for the majority of states, routine employment
continued to decline following the end of the recession.
To quantify the role of routine employment dynamics in
the 2009 jobless recovery at the state level, we conduct a
counterfactual exercise similar to that of section IIIC for the
aggregate economy. We ask what would have happened in
2009 if the postrecession behavior of routine employment
had resembled that following the 1982 recession. To do this,
we replace the ratio of per capita routine employment gains
following the trough relative to losses during the 2009 reces-
sion, with the analogous ratio observed in 1982. We then sum
up the actual employment in nonroutine occupations with the
counterfactual employment in routine occupations to obtain
a counterfactual total employment at the state level, two years
following the trough (see online appendix B for a more de-
tailed description).
Had states’ employment in routine occupations recovered
as they did following the 1982 recession, there would not
have been jobless recoveries following 2009. The final row of
table 2 reports the ratio of counterfactual per capita employ-
ment gain in the two years following the trough, relative to
the state’s (actual) peak-to-trough employment loss. For the
median state, per capita employment gains would have been
128% of its losses during the recession. This ranges from
95% at the 25th percentile to 144% at the 75th percentile.
B. International Evidence
Goos et al. (2014; hereafter, GMS) document the perva-
siveness of job polarization in Western European countries,
in data beginning in the 1990s. Building on this, we consider
whether the nature of economic recoveries has changed in
these countries.
Of the sixteen countries studied by GMS, we are able to
obtain quarterly data for aggregate employment and RGDP
for fourteen of them (Greece and Luxembourg were the ex-
ceptions), from 1971 to 2012. From these data, we generate
business cycle peak and trough dates to identify the onset and
end of recessions (see online appendix B for details). Obser-
vations are grouped together based on their timing relative to
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TABLE 3.—EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT RECOVERIES: PRE- AND POSTJOB
POLARIZATION
Means H0 : pre = post
Pre-1990 Post-1990 p-Value
A. International
Employment +1.44 −0.73 0.036
(5.18) (2.44)
Output +1.61 +1.51 0.445
(1.09) (2.12)
B. United States
Employment +0.41 −0.45 0.006
(0.45) (0.15)
Output +1.94 +1.76 0.424
(0.90) (2.08)
International data from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data; and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. U.S. data from the CPS and NIPA. See appendix
A for details.
of job polarization in our sample. We then test whether there
has been a change in the nature of employment recoveries
relative to output recoveries across time periods. We cannot
measure the joblessness of recoveries based on speed, since
employment fails to meet standard recovery criteria in an ap-
preciable number of episodes. As such, we use a measure
of the strength of recovery within a fixed time window: the
four-quarter growth of employment (and output) following
recession, normalized by the employment (output) that was
lost during the recession.15 In all of our analysis, employment
and output are expressed in per capita terms.
Panel A of table 3 presents the results of this analysis.
The first two columns of the first row present the strength
of employment recoveries, averaged across the pre-1990 and
post-1990 recession episodes, respectively. There has been a
marked fall in the recovery of employment since job polariza-
tion. In fact, while employment would expand (on average)
following early recessions, employment now continues to de-
cline during the first four quarters of recovery. The right-most
column tests the null hypothesis of equality of means across
periods, relative to the alternative hypothesis that there has
been a fall in the strength of recovery since 1990. For em-
ployment, the null is rejected at the 5% level.
By contrast, there has been essentially no change in the
strength of output recoveries. The null hypothesis of equality
of means across periods cannot be rejected at standard sig-
nificance levels. Moreover, in terms of point estimates, the
fall in the strength of output recoveries across time periods
15Note that this measure differs from that of Gali, Smets, and Wouters
(2012), who simply consider employment and output growth in the four
quarters after recession and ask whether these have changed since 1990.
Normalization is important because the severity of recessions has varied
over time. To see why this matters, consider two examples. In recession 1,
employment falls 5% during the recession and expands 5% during the first
year of recovery; in recession 2, employment falls 1% during the recession
and expands 1% during the first year of recovery. By simply measuring
postrecession growth, the recovery from recession 2 would be deemed weak
or jobless relative to recession 1, even though both regained all of their
recessionary losses in the same time period. In order for recovery growth
rates to be meaningful, they must be compared to the size of loss during
recession.
(0.094) is at least an order of magnitude smaller than the fall
for employment (2.18).
To put these results in perspective, panel B of table 3 re-
peats this analysis for the eleven postwar U.S. recessions
considered by Gali et al. (2012). Whereas employment would
rebound following early recessions, it now continues to de-
cline during recovery. Again, there has been a clear fall in
the strength of employment recoveries since 1990 that is sig-
nificant at the 1% level. By contrast, there is no statistically
significant evidence for a change in the strength of output
recovery over time. Hence, in both the United States and the
international sample, the job polarization era has realized the
emergence of jobless recoveries.
C. Subsequent Literature
Since the first working paper version of this study was writ-
ten in 2012, a number of papers have extended our results
along several dimensions.16 Furukawa and Toyoda (2013)
replicate our findings linking job polarization and jobless
recoveries in Japan. Gaggl and Kaufman (2015) develop a
methodology to categorize occupations, involving the esti-
mation of a dynamic factor model on occupational data. This
allows for the classification of occupations, based not on tasks
but solely on the time series properties of occupational em-
ployment, into two groups that “almost perfectly coincide
with ‘routine’ and ‘non-routine’ occupations,” and the iden-
tification of group-specific structural breaks in employment.
Their analysis finds a “strong tie between the well docu-
mented polarization trend and employment dynamics over
the business cycle. . . . Aggregate employment per capita
would have recovered significantly more strongly in the ab-
sence of the observed structural change around 1990.”
Burger and Schwartz (2018) also consider the link between
the disappearance of routine jobs and jobless recovery among
U.S. states, though their methodology differs from that pre-
sented above. They identify recessions using data on personal
income and GDP, and consider a larger number of state-level
episodes, including those that do not correspond to reces-
sions at the national level. Their probit analysis finds strong
and statistically significant evidence that “routine-replacing
technological change has contributed to the jobless recovery
phenomenon.” Specifically, the greater the long-run decline
of routine employment share (as obtained from an HP-filtered
trend) at the onset of recession, the greater the probability of
jobless recovery.
A number of papers have also explored our hypothesis in
cross-country data. Gaggl and Kaufman (2015) consider a
sample of sixteen (non-U.S.) industrialized economies us-
ing the EU KLEMS database. As with the results reported
above, international comparisons are hindered by the lack
16While we focus our discussion on empirical work related to this paper,
we note that a number of other papers have studied the quantitative the-
oretical link between polarization and business cycle dynamics. See, for
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of comprehensive occupation-level data and the task content
of occupations, as in the United States; as such, Gaggl and
Kaufman (2015) consider polarization dynamics by delineat-
ing employment across high-, middle-, and low-skill groups.
They find that employment recoveries have become slower
relative to output recoveries during the (country-specific) job
polarization era, though the slowdown is not as pronounced
as in the United States. Graetz and Michaels (2017) con-
sider industry-level (as opposed to occupation-level) data in
the same international sample. They find that since 1985,
industries that are more routine intensive did not experience
significantly slower employment recoveries than less routine-
intensive industries did. This is in contrast to their findings for
the United States, where cross-industry variation in routine
intensity does explain variation in the joblessness of recovery.
We conclude that the link between jobless recoveries and the
disappearance of routine employment as a worldwide phe-
nomenon deserves further study and would benefit from the
compilation of internationally comparable data on occupa-
tional tasks and employment.
V. Conclusion
In the past 35 years the U.S. labor market has been charac-
terized by job polarization and jobless recoveries. In this pa-
per, we demonstrate how these are related. We first show that
the loss of middle-skill employment in routine occupations is
concentrated in economic downturns. Second, we show that
the disappearance of routine employment accounts for job-
less recoveries. This is based on the fact that almost all of the
contraction in aggregate employment during recessions can
be attributed to job losses in routine occupations, which ac-
count for a substantial fraction of total employment, and that
jobless recoveries are observed only in these disappearing
jobs since polarization began. Moreover, the role attributed
to routine employment dynamics is not simply a proxy for the
role of industrial shifts or the changing educational composi-
tion of the economy. We supplement the aggregate evidence
with state-level evidence from the United States and evidence
from a sample of international countries that have undergone
job polarization. In all cases, we find clear evidence for the
link between job polarization and jobless recoveries.
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A. U.S. Macroeconomic Data. The population measure
is the civilian noninstitutional population, 16 years and over,
from the Current Population Survey, Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. Aggregate employment is total employment within this
population. Estimates of RGDP at a monthly frequency
are those of James Stock and Mark Watson (http://www
.princeton.edu/ mwatson/mgdp_gdi.html). These data end in
June 2010; data from July 2010 are interpolated from quar-
terly RGDP data taken from the FRED Database, Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
In section IIID, data for industrial employment are from
the Current Employment Statistics survey of the BLS, taken
from the FRED Database. Aggregate employment refers to
“all employees: total nonfarm,” manufacturing employment
is “all employees: manufacturing,” and construction employ-
ment is “all employees: construction.” Data for employment
delineated by education and occupation are from 1989 to
2012 and were obtained from the Basic Monthly Files of the
CPS, from the NBER website.
B. Employment Data by Occupation. We consider an oc-
cupational classification system that provides ease of data ac-
cess and replication and allows for the most comprehensive
time series coverage possible, extending back to 1967. Begin-
ning in 1983, our classification is based on the categorization
of occupations in the 2000 Standard Occupational Classifica-
tion system. Specifically, data for January 1983 to December
2013 are taken from FRED. Nonroutine cognitive workers
are those employed in “management, business, and financial
operations occupations” and “professional and related occu-
pations.” Routine cognitive workers are those in “sales and
related occupations” and “office and administrative support
occupations.” Routine manual occupations are “production
occupations,” “transportation and material moving occupa-
tions,” “construction and extraction occupations,” and “in-
stallation, maintenance, and repair occupations.” Nonroutine
manual occupations are “service occupations.”
Data on employment at the occupational group level from
July 1967 to December 1982 are taken from Employment
and Earnings, Bureau of Labor Statistics, various issues.
Nonroutine cognitive workers are those employed in “pro-
fessional and technical” and “managers, officials, and pro-
prietors” occupations. Routine cognitive workers are those
classified as “clerical workers” and “sales workers.” Routine
manual workers are “craftsmen and foremen,” “operatives,”
and “nonfarm labourers.” Nonroutine manual workers are
“service workers.” “Farm workers” (farmers, farm managers,
farm laborers, and farm foremen) are excluded from the em-
ployment data at the occupational level.
Finally, we note that employment at the occupational group
level displays a break between 1982 and 1983. This is due to
the extensive reclassification of occupations undertaken with
the 1980 Census codes (see, e.g., Rytina & Bianchi, 1984,
and Meyer & Osborne, 2005), and implemented in the CPS
beginning in January 1983.17 As such, we have adjusted the
data prior to 1983 to remove the discontinuity. Because the
adoption of the 1980 occupation codes occurs only one month
from the start of the recovery following the 1982 recession
(with the recessionary trough dated as November 1982 by the
NBER), the timing of the break does not affect our analysis
regarding the nature of recoveries in employment.
C. Section IV Data. High-frequency state-level data do
not exist for both pre- and postpolarization periods. As
such, we use annual data on RGDP from the Regional Eco-
nomic Accounts of the BEA (bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state).
Per capita employment data are obtained from the CPS. In
terms of international data, quarterly RGDP, the quarterly
data for aggregate employment and RGDP are from the
OECD and were obtained from the FRED Database. For thir-
teen of the fourteen countries, aggregate employment refers
to civilian employment; the exception is Belgium, where only
total employment is available. To derive per capita measures,




Using the data for routine occupations displayed in figure
5, we derive the percentage deviation in employment for the
24 months following the trough of each of the early reces-
sions. We then take the average of these deviations and refer
to this as the “average response” of routine employment dur-
ing early recoveries. This is displayed as the (last half of the)
solid line in the upper-left panel of figure B1. In the 1991,
2001, and 2009 recessions, we replace the post-trough dy-
namics of routine employment with a rescaled version of the
average response. In particular, we rescale the average re-
sponse to match the magnitude of the fall in actual routine
employment within the first five months of the trough. We
choose five months, since this is the turning point of the av-
erage response.
The counterfactual for routine employment is displayed
for the example of the 2009 recession as the hatched line in
the upper-left panel of figure B1. Because the actual fall after
the 2009 trough was greater than that in the average of the
early recessions, the average response had to be magnified.
17This is true of any occupational classification system, including the one
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FIGURE B1.—CONSTRUCTING COUNTERFACTUAL EMPLOYMENT
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey. See appendix A for details.
After 11 months, the average response turns positive. The
magnification factor would then imply a very sharp rebound
in the counterfactual. Hence, to be conservative, we set the
counterfactual for months 12 through 24 to be exactly the
average response. In the cases of the 1991 and 2001 reces-
sions, the average response fell more sharply than did actual
routine employment. In these cases, the counterfactual was
derived by attenuating the average response by the appropri-
ate factor. To be conservative on the strength of the recovery,
after the average response turns positive, we maintained the
attenuation factor.
These counterfactuals in log deviations were then used to
derive counterfactuals for routine employment levels. These
were then added to the actual employment levels in nonrou-
tine occupations to obtain counterfactual aggregate employ-
ment series. These counterfactuals in the aggregate were then
expressed as log deviations from their value at the recession
troughs to obtain figure 7.
Finally, in the upper-right, lower-left panel, and lower-right
panels of figure B1, we present the results of the same counter-
factual experiment for the 1970, 1975, and 1982 recessions.
These panels demonstrate that the nature of the early recov-
eries, which were not jobless, is not fundamentally altered
by the exercise. That is, they continue to display recoveries
in aggregate employment with roughly the same magnitude
and timing.
